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In 2010, the Aus tralian Bro adcas ting Co mpany (ABC) launched a highly success ful TV sho w called The Gruen Trans fer. The title refers
to  the diso rienting psycho lo gical effects  pro duced o n co nsumers  by the architecture o f sho pping malls , who se dazz le and no ise are
deliberately des igned to  mesmerize: o n entering, “o ur eyes  glaze o ver, o ur jaws  s lacken... we fo rget what we came fo r and beco me
impulse buyers ”.1 The ABC’s  Gruen Trans fer explo red the weird, wo nderful and diso rienting effects  pro duced by the advertis ing
indus try. Its  mo s t po pular element was  a segment called “The Pitch”, in which representatives  o f two  advertis ing agencies  co mpeted
to  sell the unsellable to  the sho w’s  audience - creating glo rio us ly s leek video s  to  market bo ttled air, pro mo te the virtues  o f banning
religio n, o r advo cate genero us  pay raises  fo r po liticians .
I have been reminded o f The Gruen Trans fer in recent mo nths , as  sectio ns  o f the media in Japan, and even internatio nally, have go ne
into  o verdrive to  sell an equally challenging message: the message that Japanese Prime Minis ter Abe Shinzo  is  no t a
natio nalis t.2 This  particular pitch has  been running fo r so me time. It began with the inceptio n o f Abe’s  firs t sho rt-lived prime
minis tership in 2006, when Japanese Fo reign Affairs  Deputy Press  Secretary Taniguchi To mo hiko  devo ted co ns iderable energy to
persuading a US audience that Abe was  “almo s t the po lar o ppo s ite” o f a natio nalis t.3 The right-o f-centre Sankei Newspaper to o k up
the challenge with enthus iasm: its  Washingto n co rrespo ndent, Ko mo ri Yo shihisa, published numero us  articles , including an o pinio n
piece in the New Yo rk Times , which aimed to  refute the “natio nalis t” tag. Far fro m being a hawkish natio nalis t, Ko mo ri argued, Abe
had “merely been shaped by demo cracy”, and his  real aim was  to  bring Japan back fro m the “po s t-war extreme to wards  the
center”.4 But these pro no uncements  had o nly limited impact o n internatio nal o pinio n, and by early 2007 o ne pro minent Japanese
marketing co nsultant was  lamenting, in the pages  o f the Yo miuri newspaper, that the go vernment needed a far mo re effective
fo reign media s trategy to  rescue Abe fro m the “hawk” and “natio nalis t” labels .5
The is sue has  resurfaced with renewed vigo r s ince the advent o f the seco nd Abe regime in December 2012. In May 2013, a US
Co ngress io nal Research Service paper describing Abe as  a “s tro ng natio nalis t” evo ked a surpris ingly querulo us  respo nse fro m pro -
go vernment media in Japan, and even fro m Prime Minis ter Abe himself. Abe hit back with a s tatement in parliament, express ing his
unhappiness  that “the ideas  o f o ur co untry” were being misunders to o d by fo reigners . He went o n to  call fo r measures  to  “actively
co llect and spread info rmatio n so  that we will be co rrectlyunders to o d”.6
The prime minis ter’s  sens itivity to  the “natio nalis t” label seems  curio us , s ince he is  o n reco rd as  arguing with co ns iderable pass io n
that there is  no thing wro ng with natio nalism: “natio nalism as  I think o f it is  a sense o f belo nging to  the nature, ances to rs , family
and the lo cal co mmunity where o ne was  bo rn and bro ught up and with which o ne has  beco me familiar. This  sense o f belo nging is  no t
so mething that we are to ld to  have, but is  co mpletely natural and spo ntaneo us ...”7; in which case, the label “s tro ng natio nalis t”
sho uld presumably be taken as  a co mpliment.
Geo rgeto wn Univers ity pro fesso r Kevin Do ak also  claims  that Abe has  been internatio nally misunders to o d. Rather than denying the
Japanese prime minis ter’s  natio nalism, tho ugh, Do ak argues  that Abe-s tyle natio nalism belo ngs  to  a brand dis tinct fro m the bad
natio nalisms  o f wartime Japan, o r (apparently) o f o ther As ian natio ns . Do ak’s  argument res ts  o n the dis tinctio n between two  quite
different types  o f natio nalism, “ethnic natio nalism” and “civic natio nalism”. He asso ciates  the firs t with the Japanese term minzo ku -
the equivalent o f the German “Vo lk” - and the seco nd with the term ko kumin - which s imply means  “peo ple o f the natio n”, and can be
given a wide range o f nuances  depending o n co ntext (tho ugh Do ak ques tio nably cho o ses  to  trans late it as  “civic natio n”).8
“Ethnic natio nalism,” writes  Do ak, “has  also  been po s itio ned as  ‘As ian natio nalism’ at leas t
s ince the 1955 Bandung Co nference; in co ntras t, civic natio nalism has  fro m its  very
beginning in mo dern Japan and thro ugho ut Eas t As ia been seen as  the favo rite o f pro -
Wes tern go vernments , Chris tian mino rities  and intellectuals  tho ught to  be tainted by
Wes tern ways  o f thinking”. The mis take o f o uts ide o bservers , he tells  us , is  that they have
taken Abe to  be an ethnic natio nalis t, whereas  in fact he is  “o ne o f the leaders  in the current
renais sance o f civic natio nalism in Japan”.
Abe’s  identity as  a civic natio nalis t can be demo ns trated (says  Do ak) by a reading o f his
bes t-selling bo o k, To wards  a Beautiful Co untry Uts ukus hi i  Kuni  e: “thro ugho ut the bo o k, Abe
co ns is tently renders  the Japanese natio n as  ko kumin (civic natio n) no t as  minzo ku (ethnic
natio n), a dis tinctio n made no t o nly co nceptually but also  thro ugh his  descriptio n o f ho w
demo cratic natio nalism functio ns  in practice.”9 Do ak’s  depictio n o f the civic and demo cratic
Abe is  in dramatic co ntras t to  his  depictio n (in a recent Sankei newspaper interview) o f
“emo tio nal So uth Ko rea”, which (apparently in to to ) “links  Japan bashing to  ethnic pride
minz o ku p urai d o ”. 10
This  re-labeling o f Abe’s  natio nalism raises  several pro blems . Firs t, it assumes  that the
pheno meno n o f natio nalism can be neatly separated into  an “ethnic” and a “civic” variant,
with the seco nd being mo rally superio r to  the firs t. But “the manichean view that there are
two  kinds  o f natio nalism, a go o d, civic kind and a bad, ethnic kind”11has  been very effectively
criticized by many scho lars , who  po int o ut that the no tio ns  o f race, culture, traditio n and
citizenship bo und up in natio nalism are far to o  co mplex to  be iso lated and captured in this
easy fo rmula. 12The identificatio n o f ethnic natio nalism as  “As ian” (o r at leas t “no n-
Wes tern”) and civic natio nalism as  “Wes tern” o r “pro -Wes tern” has  co me in fo r particular criticism. As  so cio lo gis t David McCro ne
puts  it, the dis tinctio n “do es  lend itself to  caricature - why can’t they be mo re like us?”13 His to ry sho ws  that, even in natio ns  seen as
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exemplars  o f civic natio nalism (such as  the US and France), the ethnic undercurrents  o f natio nalism can all to o  eas ily surge to  the
surface, as  they did in the US fo llo wing 9/11.
A seco nd pro blem is  that, in the co ntext o f Abe’s  po litical rheto ric, Do ak’s  dis tinctio n between minzo ku-based and ko kumin-based
natio nalism s imply do es  no t s tand up to  s crutiny. It is  no t co rrect to  s tate (as  Do ak do es) that Abe “directly rejects  ethnic
natio nalism”, o r to  imply that Abe do es  no t use the term minzo ku. Tho ugh the wo rd ko kumin o ften appears  in Abe’s  speeches  and
writings , he also  uses  the term minzo ku, and indeed uses  the two  terms  interchangeably - as  in: “when peo ple co me fro m fo reign
co untries , surely they get a sense that Japanese are a minzo ku, a ko kumin, o f high quality; they get the impress io n that even if we
are po o r, we are a co untry o f culture...” 14 Abe’s  vis io n o f a natio nal identity ro o ted in nature and traditio n is  evident in s tatements
like: “the Japanese are o riginally an agricultural minzo ku, a minzo ku who  pro duced rice by sharing water, so  I think that fro m the
beginning we have had a sense o f mutual co o peratio n built into  o ur DNA”;15 o r, mo re recently, “in the case o f Japan, in particular, we
are an agricultural minzo ku. This  is  the ‘land o f rice’. We firmly retained the traditio ns  and culture o f this  Japan. Fo r Japanese to  be
Japanese, it is  necessary that agriculture be the bas is  o f o ur co untry”.16
This  vis io n is  also  reflected in Abe’s  central ro le in a range o f po litical gro ups  which pro claim a unique natio nal character gro unded
in timeless  cultural traditio n. Fo r example, as  o f 2012 Abe headed the liaiso n gro up o f parliamentarians  co o perating with the Shinto
Asso ciatio n o f Spiritual Leadership, a bo dy that aims  to  res to re traditio nal Japanese spiritual values  weakened by po s twar
pro sperity, pro mo te the central place o f the imperial ho use in Japanese life and create a new co ns titutio n built o n Japanese natio nal
character.17
A third pro blem with the “civic natio nalis t” label is  that “civic natio nalism”
is  frequently asso ciated with liberalism, particularly respect fo r the
rights  o f the individual, and co mmitment to  equality and human
rights .18  If there is  o ne thing that Abe Shinzo  definitely is  no t, that is  a
liberal in the sense o f co mmitment to  human rights . The two  bo o ks  in
which he mo s t clearly sets  o ut his  po litical credo  bo th begin with
warnings  o f the dangers  o f liberalism (indeed, the firs t is  subtitled “The
Cho ice fo r Anti-Liberalism”).19  In the US, Abe cautio ns , the term “liberal”
has  co me to  refer to  peo ple who se ideas  are “so cialis t, o r clo se to  it...
Revo lutio naries  and left-wingers  are included in this  catego ry”.2 0  By
co ntras t, Abe firmly identifies  himself as  a co nservative. Tho ugh he
intermittently expresses  his  admiratio n fo r the British co nservative
party, his  co nservatism is  really in a dis tinctly Japanese mo ld. His
po litical hero  is  his  grandfather Kishi No busuke, a key architect o f
Japanese eco no mic po licy in prewar Manchuria who  went o n to  be a
pro fo undly co ntro vers ial po s twar Japanese prime minis ter, famo us  in
particular fo r his  very divis ive ro le in ramming ratif icatio n o f the 1960
Security Treaty with the US thro ugh the Japanese parliament.21
Abe’s  co re go al, inherited fro m Kishi, clearly set o ut in To wards  a Beautiful Co untry, and echo ed in the manifes to s  o f gro ups  like the
Shinto  Asso ciatio n o f Spiritual Leadership, is  to  “escape fro m the po s twar regime”: that is , to  reverse the po litical refo rms
intro duced to  Japan during the allied o ccupatio n. In his  view, these refo rms  undermine Japan’s  traditio ns , which are centred o n the
figure o f the Empero r. What Abe’s  natio nalis t vis io n means  in practice is  bes t unders to o d by examining his  party’s  far-reaching
pro po sals  to  rewrite the po s twar Japanese co ns titutio n. The pro po sed changes  include remo ving the reference to  “respect fo r the
individual” and making it co ns titutio nally impo ss ible fo r fo reign permanent res idents  to  be given natio nal o r lo cal vo ting rights .
Freedo m o f express io n and freedo m o f asso ciatio n wo uld no t be pro tected where these “have the purpo se o f harming the public
interes t o r public o rder”. The same fo rmula wo uld be used to  limit the right o f citizens  to  “life, liberty and the pursuit o f happiness ”.
The revised co ns titutio n prepared by the Liberal Demo cratic Party co ntains  no  guidelines  as  to  ho w, and by who m, “public interes t”
and “public o rder” wo uld be defined, leaving an alarmingly large lo o pho le fo r the repress io n o f civic freedo ms  by the s tate. A new
article wo uld also  be added to  the co ns titutio n to  give the s tate sweeping po wers  to  declare pro lo nged s tates  o f emergency, during
which co ns titutio nal rights  co uld be suspended.22 With the pro spect o f an LDP super-majo rity in parliament fo r the next two  to  three
years , there is  a s tro ng likeliho o d that the ruling party will push fo rward with an attempt to  carry o ut these changes: changes  so
pro fo und that they sho uld pro bably be described, no t as  plans  fo r co ns titutio nal revis io n, but rather as  plans  fo r a new co ns titutio n.
The current po pularity o f the Abe adminis tratio n in no  way reflects  public enthus iasm fo r these grand po litical des igns . It is , ins tead,
a respo nse to  the go vernment’s  eco no mic s timulus  package, and to  Abe’s  skill in making o ptimis tic s tatements , which co nvey a
sense o f leadership to  a po pulatio n weary o f po litical uncertainty and eco no mic malaise. In the end, the Abe go vernment’s
perfo rmance sho uld and will be judged, no t o n any po litical labels , but o n the impact that it has  o n Japanese so ciety and o n Japan’s
relatio ns  with its  regio n and the wo rld. It is  po ss ible that Abe may yet cho o se to  fo cus  o n the vital tasks  o f creating a bas is  fo r a
s tro ng Japanese eco no mic future and impro ving relatio ns  with Japan’s  neighbo urs , rather than pursuing the ideo lo gical agendas  o f
anti-liberalism and “escape fro m the po s twar regime”.
In the meanwhile, tho ugh, tho se who  care abo ut the future o f Japanese so ciety sho uld no t allo w the dazz le o f verbal juggling to
induce a po litical vers io n o f the Gruen Trans fer. The prime minis ter’s  ideo lo gy may be re-branded fo r the glo bal market, but the o ld
adage remains : buyer beware.
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